Gulf Coast Upgrade
Affordable and efficient can co-exist — even after a disaster
Project Design Based on Recent Case Studies
The FSEC had recently completed a series of case studies as part of a multiorganizational, multiyear study for DOE. Three of those case studies, in particular, documented climate-
specific strategies for achieving cost-effective improvements in production-built homes. Along with a case study based on a pair of commercial production home builders—G.W. Robinson Builders and Tommy Williams Homes—FSEC researchers also produced one based on work done by the Lakeland (Florida) Habitat for Humanity affiliate between 2000 and 2006, when it built and sold more than 50 homes.
The Lakeland Habitat affiliate results—which mirrored those of the commercial home builders—demonstrated that a $2,500 package of incremental construction and mechanical improvements could achieve a 30% Whole-House, Source-Energy Savings (WHSES), equivalent to a HERS Index of approximately 73, with energy savings that created positive cash flow for homeowners.
The FSEC subsequently obtained financing to conduct a demonstration project to introduce a similar package of performance improvements in homes being built along the central Gulf Coast—a swath of coastal cities and towns stretching roughly from Panama City, Florida, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana—as part of the massive postdisaster rebuilding effort. And while FSEC researchers have worked with Habitat for Humanity since 1995, previously consulting on a total of more than 500 houses built by 50-plus affiliates in more than 20 states, they simply were not prepared for what they encountered.
“The personal challenges, the industry challenges, the code challenges, and just the sheer magnitude of the need that existed at that time are just hard to fathom without actually having been there,” recalls FSEC research analyst Janet McIlvaine. And when McIlvaine and fellow research analyst David Beal returned to the area in October 2007, things had not gotten much better. While it was true that rebuilding in general had already built up a head of steam, the operating environment still appeared to be extremely unstable.
While Habitat affiliates throughout the region now enjoyed more financial and volunteer support than they ever had before, “the basic process of just getting a single house started proved extremely challenging,” McIlvaine explains. “Supply chains were broken, and a range of building materials were scarce. There was a tremendous amount of confusion regarding local codes and issues regarding flood-plain elevations. Individuals were still sorting out their own situations regarding insurance payments, federal assistance money, whether to renovate, rebuild, or relocate. As a result, the construction industry as a whole was in flux.”
Challenge and Incentives in Postdisaster Building
The pressure on organizations, both commercial and nonprofit, has ramped up significantly. Habitat for Humanity’s 20 or so Gulf Coast affiliates, according to Habitat International headquarters in Americus, Georgia, increased the pace of home building by an average of more than 30%, increasing the number of houses built or rehabbed per year across the region from fewer than 60 to more than 400. For some affiliates, the pace increased exponentially—in New Orleans, for example, an organization that built houses from 1984 to 2005 at the rate of approximately 12 to 14 per year, completed 300 houses between 2005 and 2010, an average of 60 per year.
Even in context, the upsurge in Habitat construction has been remarkable. According to the organization’s figures, the three Habitat affiliates currently bordering the southeast, eastern, and northeast portions of Lake Pontchartrain—a nexus of urban and suburban environments where damage and relocation rates have both been extremely high—were ranked (as of 2010) among the top ten most active private home builders in Louisiana. Post-Katrina, those three parish affiliates combined were responsible for repairing, renovating, and building a total of more than 550 houses, with 70 more planned for 2011 construction.
In the case of the New Orleans Habitat affiliate, this achievement is even more remarkable given the fact that basic utility services were not restored throughout most of the city until the first quarter of 2006. In the following four years, the organization recruited and deployed more than 120,000 volunteers, which included constructing two successive volunteer camps providing temporary shelter for 80,000-plus volunteers.
Project Planned for a Difficult Environment
Fully aware they’d be pursuing that goal not only in a chaotic postdisaster setting but also in what they understatedly described as “the challenging affordable-housing sector,” FSEC researchers carefully designed their demonstration-program project to accommodate a wide range of newly recruited participants.
The basic outline included a series of workshops to introduce basic concepts and recruit participants; a clear assessment of each affiliate’s building practices; continued on-site training and hands-on support; an intermediate goal of first attaining Energy Star-certified performance before moving on to further improvements; and finally, a program that called for building a single demonstration house in which fundamental concepts would be applied, followed by the construction of a second demonstration house where lessons learned from the first house would be applied.
And as the project got under way, FSEC researchers felt the outlook was favorable based on conversations with prime potential partners. But while the project kicked off optimistically, signs that things might not work out as planned showed up from the start.
Although it was cosponsored by the Home Builders Association of Metro Mobile, and despite a mass mailing to 1,700-plus organization members, attendance at that first Mobile workshop, held in November 2008, was sparse. The following two workshops, held in Baton Rouge and Covington, Louisiana, attracted only 50 attendees.
Once the actual work began, things got even tougher. As FSEC research analysts McIlvaine and Beal wrote in their final report, “Researchers found that the builder partners and other builders who participated in the workshops were not accustomed to thinking about establishing a whole-house air barrier; a sealed duct system including the return plenum; neutral or slightly positive house air pressures; or a continuous drainage plane behind vented or water-absorbing exterior wall cladding. Training on these core concepts was essential to ensure successful implementation.”
The pair also found that “standard building practices in the area needed to be addressed prior to introducing the proposed improvements, as the area’s standard practice would undermine performance enhancements.” Add to that the fact that each Habitat affiliate, while connected to Habitat for Humanity International headquarters, is essentially an independent organization, each with its own building methods and acceptable standards. Then throw in the wide spectrum of postdisaster scenarios and local conditions faced uniquely by each affiliate, and you’ve got a series of disparate operating environments.
Given all that, it’s no surprise that with seven participants and the potential of 14 prototype houses being constructed, only 11 houses were actually built; and of those, only 9 finally met project-qualifying criteria.
Outstanding Achievements and Slightly Compromised Findings
Of the 9 houses that finally met the project’s qualifying criteria, all met the initial target of a 30% WHSES, roughly translated as a HERS Index of 73 or lower (see Figure 1, p. 52). Of those, only three homes met the project’s ultimate goal of 40% WHSES (roughly translated as a HERS Index of 64 or lower). Only two pairs of prototypes demonstrated the project’s hoped-for showing of improved performance from the first to second prototype.
Final totals? Of 14 prototype houses that might have been built, 11 were completed, and 9 met the project’s qualifying criteria; of those, 6 met the project’s 30% WHSES target, and 3 achieved a 40% WHSES improvement. Cost results, however, were slightly less conclusive. To begin with, eight participants submitted incomplete invoices, to which project researchers then added estimates of unaccounted-for costs; and one failed to report any final costs.
Based on the final-cost estimates, five completed improvement packages that cost less than $2,500. In the remaining four cases, costs exceeding project goals were based solely on affiliate choices. One opted for a package that included a metal roof, raised heal trusses, and exterior rigid insulation totaling $2,800; and the sixth installed a package duplicating its first prototype. In another case, the costs of a higher-performance heat pump and a more-extensive insulation package pushed the project total to $3,300. And in two cases, affiliates opted for higher-end hot water systems including heat pump and solar options that pushed the total cost of improvements to $4,200 and $6,300, respectively.
While calculations of annual cash flow to the homeowner based on estimated final costs proved advantageous in all nine cases (assuming 30-year, 7% mortgages, and average energy rates of $0.12/kWh), cash flow figures recorded in the project’s final report were based on the fairly complex benchmarking standards using a late-1990s vintage house for comparison as required by Building America, rather than readily available HERS reference costs.
Nonetheless, researchers see the project as having been extremely successful, especially for achieving favorable, and impressive, performance-improvement outcomes under what can be described as some of the most challenging conditions imaginable. They also point to the fact that all nine completed prototypes calculated positive first-year cash flow, supporting the Building America goal. They also feel that the project’s value is enhanced by the fact that these outcomes were achieved with project partners who were exclusively volunteer-assisted builders.
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