|
| Back to Contents Page |
Home Energy Index |
About Home Energy |
| Home Energy Home Page | Back Issues of Home Energy |
Home Energy Magazine Online November/December 1992
CONTRACTING
Performance Contracting: Advice To Utilities
by Gil Peach
Gil Peach, formerly a program evaluator for Pacific Power and Light,
is an independent consultant to several utilities.
A demand-side management program
can unravel when expectations of
utility and contractor don't mesh.
A well-worded performance contract
can keep all parties happy.
Editor's Note: Residential performance contracting is unfamiliar
territory for most utilities. Agreeing upon what is to be delivered,
how to evaluate it, and how to pay for it has been a matter of trial
and error, often accompanied by disputes over differing expectations.
Dialogue will increase the chance of negotiating contracts that ensure
delivery of a quality product and a fair return to both parties. To
promote such back and forth, this article and
the one that follows (see p. 23) offer two perspectives on
what performance-based contracts ought to include. One perspective
comes from an experienced advisor to utilities, the other from the
director of an energy services company.
We also recommend readers see these related Home
Energy articles: "Bidding for
Demand-side Management Performance Contracts" (Jan/Feb '91,
p.33), "Moving Weatherization
Agencies into the Utility Age," and
"Contracting with WAP Agencies: the
Utility Perspective" (Nov/Dec '91, p. 12 and p. 19,
respectively).
Many utilities are using, or considering using, residential
performance contracting to carry out energy conservation programs.
Under this arrangement, an energy service company (ESCo) under
contract to the utility agrees to deliver a stipulated amount of saved
energy, for which the utility pays a set price per killowatt-hour
(kWh).
Ideally, performance contracting should be good for the utility and
ESCo alike. For the utility, it should decrease the financial risk of
demand-side management (DSM) investment by, as its proponents
claim, "turning conservation over to the free market." By transferring
to the marketplace the responsibility for delivering savings,
presumably the utility would avoid the need to invest in additional
staff, materials, and management control systems and the need to
build the expertise required to achieve savings cost-effectively.
Unfortunately, these benefits may fail to materialize because
performance contracting also carries risks beyond those posed by the
traditional utility-contractor relationship. Performance guarantees
can be illusory. Payment plans that appear to put an ESCo at risk can
actually ensure it will realize a profit. The need to monitor the
retrofit process in order to protect against "cream skimming" and lost
opportunities may oblige the utility to expand its staff and undertake
new training programs. [Editor's note: Some conservation measures
are cost-effective only when implemented in conjunction with other
measures. When a contractor installs only the most cost-effective
measures, a practice called "cream skimming," return visits by others
to capture savings from more marginal conservation resources are
less profitable.]
These risks stem from the fact that performance contracting is new
territory. What sorts of payment and delivery terms end up being
fair to both partners in the venture is a matter of experimentation,
the results of which will become clearer as more utilities and ESCos
strike mutually advantageous agreements.
Meanwhile, utilities can protect themselves by developing contract
provisions that will reduce the risks besetting performance
contracting at its present stage of development. The following
contracting guidelines will help provide this protection.
Guidelines
Avoid front-loading. Don't pay for work until the savings have
been measured. Many of the early performance contracting
experiments were undertaken reluctantly due to orders from public
utility commissions. Because the performance contracting market
was not mature (and sometimes hardly existed), utilities thought
they were obliged to help capitalize an ESCo infrastructure. Thus, a
contract might call for the utility to pay in advance for the first
year's planned savings. The ESCo would then reimburse the utility if
measured savings fell below the targets set by the contract. A utility
should only use this "front-loading" approach for a clear strategic
reason, for example if the utility considers DSM a transient
phenomenon. In this event, the contractor should pay back all
interest earned on the money advanced by the utility.
Define baseline measurements cautiously. Be very careful in
defining the baseline from which to measure savings, especially if
the ESCo suggests calculating the baseline from several years of
billing data on each house. Do not expect the ESCo to treat these data
as a utility analyst or time-and-materials contractor would. Expect
the ESCo to use the data to justify setting the most profitable-that is,
the highest-baseline. A more prudent approach for a utility is to
insist on a single year as the base year.
Avoid payments based on "treatment groups." Measure
changes in the energy usage of treated buildings annually or in
multi-year intervals. Be very careful if the ESCo suggests the creation
of treatment groups based on months and quarters of work. Any
complicated payment system based on treatment groups can easily
cost the utility many person-months of effort to untangle if there is a
dispute.
Provide for a waiting period between completion of installation
and assessment of results. Let the project come to an end, and, if
possible, let another year go by before finishing the assessment of
results. ESCos often suggest measuring results as soon after the
retrofit as possible, in order to maximize the value of the achieved
savings. As time passes, some residents may decide to remove
measures they don't like, and some of the effects of poor installation
and materials have a greater chance of showing up. Unless the
program is a low-cost/no-cost blitz in which public relations is as
important as energy savings, the utility should wait to measure
savings until a year or two after installation at the last site. From a
utility's perspective, only reliable savings should be paid for.
Reserve control over inspections. By accepting "integrated
packages," where the ESCo provides not only the audit and
installation but also the inspection, financing, and verification, a
utility loses control and risks prudence review by a public utilities
commission. Do not accept conditions on when and where to inspect.
Surprise inspections have a deterrent value. It may be necessary to
concentrate inspections in locales where you suspect problems.
Inspectors should always carry a camera and photograph every
failed installation or broken measure. Full documentation with
photos is powerful evidence and will make for quick, favorable legal
judgments. (It's best to use a 35-mm camera with high-ASA color
film. Polaroid instant photos are expensive to reproduce.)
Reserve control over reliability and verification studies. Send
inspectors out three and six years after the measures, again with
cameras. Many failures due to poor materials and improper
installation will be visible by then. For example, "one size fits all"
pipe wraps will have deteriorated significantly.
Do not agree to pay the full avoided cost per kWh saved.
When a utility agrees to pay for all savings that can be acquired up
to avoided cost, a certain proportion of those savings-the easiest ones
to get-will actually cost less than full avoided cost. Paying the full
cost for them is tantamount to handing over windfall profits to the
ESCo.
Incorporate the use of control groups. If possible, measure net
results against a control group to prevent the ESCo from being paid
for savings that would have occurred anyway, say from "free riders,"
and to avoid penalizing the ESCo if electricity use is generally
increasing. Realize that the ESCo and the utility have different
interests in the measurement of results. An ESCo seeks to save the
most kWh for the least investment. Moreover, the savings need only
last through the final measurement. For this reason, the optimal
saving for the ESCo is less than the utility would seek to produce in
the same building, using a time-and-materials approach. The ESCo
minimizes its performance risk at the expense of the utility's long-
term interest in acquiring all cost-effective conservation resources at
reasonable prices.
Preclude evaluation gaming. Do not accept any ESCo-proposed
measurement plan that excludes cases where usage increases
following treatment, or "negative savings." Dropping negative savings
distorts the analysis and artificially raises average savings, providing
a windfall for the ESCo (see Tables 1
and 2).
Beware of proposals to target high-use customers. If the ESCo
requests that the utility supply a list of high-use customers to choose
from, be careful how to interpret savings achieved. It's easy to
"mine" high-use customers and bang out jobs that show, on the
average, what one may be accustomed to seeing as reasonable
savings for a utility-administered, time-and-materials contract
program. But these are not reasonable savings for the high tail of the
distribution. The ESCo can substantially underserve these customers
and still be paid for substantial savings.
Prohibit the addition of units to the sample covered by the
contract. If the ESCo proposes to "maintain" the reliability of
savings by creating a contractual right to add units at their own
initiative, consider finding another ESCo. Adding units creates the
risks of unforeseen financial liability and erosion of conservation
resources. Instead, insist on a guarantee of savings in the units
assigned. Do not allow any language that opens the window for an
ESCo to treat any residences except those reviewed and authorized in
writing.
Use standard contract language. Assume the ESCo will seek
contract language that allows it to wring maximum profit from
customers and the utility resource plan. Follow the advice of the legal
department to guard against fraud and ensure that data quality,
inspection, and verification methodology will stand up to a
regulatory commission's prudence review, which is not likely to
occur until after the ESCo has finished the job and moved on.
Include interest earned by the ESCo in cost calculations. If the
utility program requires a co-payment from the customer and if the
ESCo offers to finance that co-payment, investigate whether the ESCo
is acting as a finance company in disguise. If the total financed co-
payment is large enough, the ESCo may be making more money on
interest than on the profit per saved kWh. If this is the case,
especially if customer interest equals or exceeds the nominal co-
payment, the utility should rerun its cost models to factor in what
the ESCo is earning in interest.
These 13 suggestions, based on lessons learned from real cases, will
help control excesses. It would certainly be unfair to imply that most
ESCo's are interested in making unreasonable profits at the expense
of the utility and its customers by selling unreliable or illusory
savings. Nevertheless, until field results help us better define a truly
equitable relationship, any utility embarking upon residential
performance contracting must exercise vigilance, control, and
guidance over the process.
Table 1. Simulation: Omitting "Negative Savings" Tips the Balance
Measured Measured
savings savings without
Home (kWh) negative savings(kWh)
______________________________________________________________
1 100 100
2 110 110
3 -200
4 150 150
5 200 200
6 -150
7 -110
8 100 100
9 100 100
10 200 200
______________________________________________________________
Total savings 500 960
from project
Average savings 50 137
per home
__________________________________________________________
This simulation illustrates how the omission of negative
savings can affect the calculation of savings for an ESCo
and therefore how it will be paid by the utility. Negative
savings occur when energy usage increases rather than
decreases following an installation of energy conservation
measures. Notice that dropping out negative savings nearly
doubles the billable savings, 500 kWh versus 960 kWh.
Table 2. Case study: Effect of Excluding "Negative Savings" from Total Savings
Average Normalized
Annual Consumption (NAC)
____________________________________
All households Only households
including those with positive
with postive savings savings
___________________________________________________________
Pre-"installation"(kWh) 23,300 24,400
Post-"installation"(kWh) 24,500 22,200
Savings (kWh) -1,200 2,200
___________________________________________________________
Energy consumption data, before and after "retrofit," from a random sample
of 209 residential customers shows "negative savings." A subset of 80
households, however, does show savings. The irony is that the utility executed
no program, demonstrating that energy "savings" and losses can occur naturally.
Pre-"installation" data was taken from a base year, a pseudo-program
implementation year was skipped, and the post-"installation" data drawn from
the following calendar year. Portland General Electric provided the data set, a
Princeton Scorekeeping Method (PRISM) analysis was performed on it, and PRISM
reliability tests were imposed. NACs utilized weather data from National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
| Back to Contents Page |
Home Energy Index |
About Home Energy |
| Home Energy Home Page | Back Issues of Home Energy |
Home Energy can be reached at: contact@homeenergy.org
Home Energy magazine -- Please read our Copyright Notice
|